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The paper discusses the impact of market power in the Hungarian milk chain. In a first step a 
vector error correction model is estimates to assess whether a domestic market for raw milk 
exists. Since the answer was positive we proceed by developing a structural market model of 
the Hungarian market for raw milk that is able to identify a possible affect of market power on 
resource allocation. A nonlinear 3SLS approach was applied to estimate the supply and the 
demand  for  raw  milk.  The  results  provide  that  despite  the  high  concentration  of  in  dairy 
processing the indications for market poser are rather limited. The “Bertrand like” equilibrium 
can  be  attributed  to  the  low  degree  of  capacity  utilization  in  dairy  processing  and  the 
marketing alternative of farmers.  
Keywords: market power, market integration, dairy, Hungary. 
1  INTRODUCTION 
The  transition  process  in  Eastern  Europe  was  characterized  by  three  basic  elements: 
privatization, liberalization, and restructuring. The main intention behind the reforms was the 
substitution  of  the  centrally  planned  economies  by  market  coordination.  Decentralized 
coordination was expected to implement incentive compatible decision mechanisms which in 
turn should allow the allocation of resource to their most beneficial uses. In addition, the 
improved remuneration of resources should foster economic growth and the increase of per 
capita income. A favourable transformation process required a basic transformation of the 
institutional environment within the countries. In most of the transition countries, especially 
those in Central Europe, these reforms have been implemented and enforced. Because of this 
the transition process is considered to be finished and the countries are officially classified as 
market economies. 
However, changing the institutional environment can be regarded as a development on the 
"razors edge". The main reason is that the institutional innovations are not exogenous but 
endogenous. They are the results of long-lasting bargaining processes in which interest groups 
attempt to influence the institutional environment in favour of the parties they represent. As a 
consequence  of  the  impact  of  pressure  groups  structures  may  be  established  that  induce 
market failures and thus hamper the free allocation of resources according to market signals. 
Possible  consequences  are  the  establishing  of  market  power  through  technological  and 
institutional barriers of entry that enable interest groups to extract extraordinary rents at the 
costs of the transaction partners. This in turn suggests that the analysis of market results can 
be used to assess the success of the transition process. 
Several  studies  have  been  conducted  in  this  respect,  especially  in  agricultural  economics. 
Most of these use price transmission analysis to assess whether horizontal and vertical market 
integration exists (with regard to Central Europe see BOJNEC 2002, BAKUCS, FERTİ 2005, 
BAKUCS et al. 2006, and PETER 2003). While symmetric price transmission can be attributed 
to functioning markets, the conclusion that asymmetric integration is an indication of market 
failure is misleading since asymmetries can also be due to lagged price responses, demand 
changes,  technological  change,  outsourcing  of  functions  and  cost  changes  (MEYER,  von 
CRAMON – TAUBADEL 2004). Consequently, no definite conclusions regarding market failures 
are possible. 
The objective of this paper is to assess market functioning by evaluating the significance of 
market power directly using a structural market model. Within this framework not only price 
but in addition quantity data will be used to assess resource allocation on markets. We will 
apply the approach to the development on the Hungarian milk market between 1998 and 2006 
and  discuss  whether  the  institutional  setting  led  to  conditions  that  are  consistent  with  a functioning market or whether frictions are present that allow some parties to appropriate the 
rents associated with milk production. We focus on the dairy chain for several reasons. First 
dairy production is an important source of farm income. Second, the Hungarian milk market 
was subject to policy shocks which induces significant adjustment in milk production and 
processing. Third, milk processing is highly concentrated and dominated by foreign capital. 
Forth milk prices in Hungary belong to the lowest in the new EU member states. Especially 
the two latter conditions might suggest the existence of considerable market power. 
The paper is organized in six chapters. Following the introduction stylized fact regarding the 
Hungarian  dairy  chain  are  presented.  The  descriptions  are  intended  to  provide  a  first 
indication  of  the  possibility  of  market  power.  Chapter  3  discusses  whether  the  transition 
process in Hungary succeeded in the development of a domestic market for raw milk. This 
analysis provides not only first results regarding market functioning, but  also motivates the 
deduction of the structural market model in chapter 4. In the fourth part the structural market 
model is derived. Chapter 5 deals with the econometric implementation of the model and the 
discussion  of  estimation  results.  Chapter  6  summarizes  our  findings  and  discusses  their 
implication for policy interventions. 
2  DESCRIPTION OF THE HUNGARIAN DAIRY CHAIN  
2.1  Market regulations of milk and milk products
1 
The transition to a market economy and, later, the compliance with the acquis communautaire 
necessitated the adoption of new intervention methods and a legislative basis for them. In the 
1990s,  Hungary  enacted  a  policy  towards  improving  raw  milk  quality  in  so  far  as  price 
support was only given to raw milk which met minimum EU quality standards. As a result, in 
2003, about 95 % of all supplies to dairies met the EU-standards. 
The creation of the agricultural market regime in 1993 aimed to alleviate extreme fluctuations 
in  supply  and  prices  of  commodities  and  to  establish  a  minimum  guarantee  for  primary 
production. It was an indirect subsidy for the producer, but provided to processors (after 1999 
for Extra quality milk only) if they paid at least the centrally-fixed target price to the farmers. 
The indirect subsidies were complemented by export subsidies which were needed to stabilize 
the  domestic  market.  One  severe  problem  was  setting  the  target  price  for  raw  milk 
unreasonably high, especially in 1998-99 and in 2002-03. The government started to create 
the milk price without respect to the market situation, which caused a huge surplus and finally 
led to losses and uncertainty for market players. Moreover, since the form of subsidization 
was incompatible with the EU market organization for milk and milk products the system was 
abolished in the beginning of 2004. 
A guaranteed milk price was introduced in 1996, but its extremely low level has prevented it 
from  being  effective;  no  intervention  purchases  have  been,  and,  no  institution  has  been 
designated to carry out intervention purchases. Furthermore, there have also been intervention 
prices (lower and upper) in force since 2000. When the market price reaches the level of 
either of these two, government interventions should follow in order to keep the market price 
within the price band – but this was never specified.  
After continuing pressure from producer organizations a raw milk quota system was  also 
introduced in 1996. Producers expected the quota to secure a safe marketing outlet for their 
milk. Thus the objective of introducing the quota was not to fight surpluses but to create 
                                                 
1  A  description  of  milk  market  policy  in  Hungary  can  be  found  in  HOCKMANN,  VİNEKI 
(2004). orderly marketing. Quota applications by producers had to be based on actual supplies in the 
previous year, but the system allowed producers to pad their reference quantities to provide 
room for expansion. During EU accession negotiations, Hungary requested a national quota of 
2.8  million  tons  of  milk.  However,  the  quotas  were  fixed  by  the  Commission  based  on 
delivered  production  figures  and  direct  sales  between  1997  and  1999.  The  final  national 
production quota amounts to 1,947,280 t of raw milk (1,782,650 t for deliveries and 164,630 t 
for direct sale). The EU also agreed on a “milk quota reserve” of 42,780 t that will be given to 
Hungary  in  2006  to  compensate  for  the  expected  increase  in  retail  demand  for  milk  that 
should  result  from  a  decrease  in  on-farm  consumption.  The  national  quota  for  deliveries 
approved by the EU could not be fulfilled in each year (Figure 1). Therefore, the quota has not 
been restrictive, supply capacities and demand constraints limited output growth instead.  
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Source: TEJ TERMÉKTANÁCS, KSH –  STATISZTIKAI ÉVKÖNYV, ÁLLATÁLLOMÁNY 
2.2  Development of milk production and consumption 
The constant decrease of the milk producer prices due to the abolishment of the national price 
support system in 2004 led despite rising milk yields to smaller milk production in Hungary. 
Only 79-83% of total production was delivered to dairy companies. This shows the great 
importance of direct marketing and internal consumption on farms. Moreover, the share of 
raw milk delivered to domestic dairy companies decreased after 2004. In 2005, 1,49 million t 
of raw milk was delivered to the dairy industry, by 2% less than in 2004. It is estimated that in 
2006, deliveries will further decrease by approximately 12% to around 1,31 million t. 
The main reason for the reduction is the dynamic increase of raw milk export to Italy. Export 
quantities have increased from 43,000 t in 2004 to 108.00 t in 2005. In the first half of 2006 
exports to Italy amounted to already 110,000 t. At the same time, import of raw milk has also 
increased, mainly from Slovakia, however to a less extend. However, imported raw milk still 
has a marginal share on total milk processing. The consumed volume of dairy products hasn’t 
chanced significantly in the last years. However, in the case of high value added products 
(especially by cheese) some increase could be observed.  
2.3  Structure of milk production 
Since  the  accession,  Hungarian  cow  stock  is  decreasing  continuously.  Between  2003  and 
2006, the number of cows has  reduced by  9%, from 359.000 to 326.000. Approximately 250.000 cows were hold in enterprises with an agricultural area larger than 50 ha. The main 
part of the stock (223.000 animals) was hold by legal entities and less than a third of the total 
stock (102.000 animals) were at private firms. The decrease since 2003 was at private firms 
with 13% more strongly. This concentration was essentially caused by the price development 
for raw milk due to the abolishment of the national supports. However, the number of small 
producer with 1-9 cows is relative high yet, 90% of the enterprises belongs to this category. 
Despite  of  this,  compared  to  the  other  member  states,  milk  production  in  Hungary  is 
concentrated. Approximately 98% of the raw milk is produced in enterprises with more than 
100 cows.  
2.4  Processing industry 
Between 1997 and 2004, the number of milk processors in Hungary has decreased from 104 
to 93. In 2004 the ten largest enterprises bought up approximately 70% of the raw milk. At 
present, the largest enterprise (Sole-Mizo) has a market share of 26%, followed by Friesland 
with 24%. While in the second half of the nineties and also at the beginning of this century the 
Hungarian dairy industry was dominated by foreign enterprises, this has changed slightly in 
recent years. The largest enterprise was bought by a Hungarian investor and also Parmalat 
with approximately 20% market share was taken over in the spring of 2006 by 140-150 milk 
producers.  The  big  influence  of  foreign  companies  on  the  Hungarian  raw  milk  market 
together with the extremely high concentration suggest that farmers are in a poor bargaining 
position and processors might be able to exploit significant market power. 
Despite of low milk prices, Hungarian dairy enterprises are not competitive neither on the 
foreign nor on the domestic market. Due to increasing imports since accession, Hungary has 
become a net importer of dairy products. In 2005, export value amounted to 118 millions 
USD, while import value has reached 191 millions USD. Especially, the increasing proportion 
of  imported  cheap  dairy  products  with  partially  insufficient  quality  from  the  neighbour 
countries  had  a  negative  affect  on  the  dairy  industry.  Increasing  import  volumes  were 
registered particularly in the categories of consumer milk and cheese. Besides the dynamic 
increase  of  raw  milk  deliveries  to  Italy,  overseas  sells  of  fruit  yogurt  increase,  while  the 
export of other dairy products decreased. The increase with regard to fruit yogurt can be 
explained with the strategy of the foreign dairy companies active in Hungary, which supply 
different Eastern European markets from Hungary. 
3  HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION OF THE RAW MILK MARKET 
Between 1995 and 2003 the target price was adjusted annually at increasing levels. During 
this period, the average market price for raw milk followed the target price without significant 
regional  differences  between  Lowlands,  Transdanubia  and  Northern  Hungary  (Figure  2). 
Until 2004, Hungarian milk producers received a high milk price compared with other new 
member  states  such  as  Poland,  the  Czech  Republic  or  Slovakia.  Since  the  accession,  the 
situation has changed in principle. The abolishment of the national price support system in the 
beginning of 2004 led to decrease of the raw milk price. With 24-26 Ct/kg in 2005, Hungarian 
milk prices were by 5% lower than in 2004.  In 2006, the decrease was 8%. As a result, 
Hungarian milk prices have reached the lowest level in the region in 2006. In addition, the 
break  in  2994  has  also  an  impact  regarding  price  leadership.  Before  2004  prices  in  the 
Lowlands  were  the  highest.  This  situation  changed  in  2004  insofar  as  the  prices  in  the 
Lowlands regions are now below those in Transdanubia and Northern Hungary. Moreover, all 
series show a significant seasonal pattern with high prices during the winter month and low 
prices during summer.  An analysis of market power on the national level is only meaningful, when the regional 
markets for raw milk are integrated. In this paper we will not provide detailed information on 
the results of the various estimations. Instead we will concentrate on those findings which are 
relevant for conclusion regarding horizontal market integration. 
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Source: AKI – PÁIR 
Because of the break in the time series, we conducted the corresponding analysis for the two 
periods  before  and  after  the  abolishment  of  the  price  support  system.  In  a  first  step  the 
seasonal patterns were removed from the series. The adjusted series were checked whether 
they possess unit roots. The correct identification of unit roots is pivotal for the formulation of 
the error correction model. Since none of the various tests for unit roots is superior under all 
circumstances, different test statistics were analysed. The Augmented Dickey Fuller (FULLER 
1996) and the nonparametric test developed by BREITUNG (2002) were applied. In the first 
period  (1998-2003)  a  constant  and  a  trend  variable  were  considered  to  account  for  the 
increase  of  prices  while  in  the second  period  the  trend  variable  was  omitted.  The  results 
provide strong statistical evidence for the existence of  unit roots in the series.
2. 
The thereon following co-integration analysis was based on an error correction model: 
(1)  t i t
i









Pairwise comparisons of the price developments in the three regions were conducted. This 
procedure was chosen to be able to account for a possible change in price leaderships after 
2003. Estimations were conducted using the JOHANSON (1992) procedure. Both, the ltrace as 
well as the lmax test suggest the existence of a co-integrated relationship in all six cases. The 
optimal lag length (r) was selected using the Hannan –Quinn and the Akaike criterions and 
was 1 and 2, depending on the individual pairs of prices. The co-integrating relationship is 
represented by  1 - P t w , with w the raw milk price. With co-integration and two variables the 
rank of P P P P is one, and the vector can be separated in two vectors a a a a and b b b b, with P P P P = a a a a b b b b’ and 
each with rank one. b b b b’ wt-1 represents the long run relationship in the model. The loading 
                                                 
2   Both procedures provide that the hypothesis of the existence of a unit root with constant 
and trend could not be rejected at a 5% level of significance. matrix a a a a reflect the velocity of with which, after a shock, the system converges to the long-
term equilibrium (LÜTKEPOHL 2004). Moreover the statistical properties of a a a a can be used to 
decide  whether  a  variable  is  exogenous  in  the  system,  and  thus,  to  determine  the  causal 
relationships among the prices. In the following we will concentrate on these results only 
(Figure 3).  














significant at a =   5% 
significant at a = 10%   
Source: own estimation 
In the first period, raw milk prices were mainly determined by Northern Hungary. After the 
abolishment  of  the  price  support  system,  the  situation  changed  significantly,  since 
Transdanubia has taken price leadership. However, the co-integration analyses suggest that 
arbitrage between the regions cannot be rejected, and moreover, that a national market for raw 
milk exists which in turn justifies an analysis of market power on the national level. 
4  MARKET POWER: A STRUCTURAL MARKET MODEL 
We  follow  the  methodology  developed  by  BRESNAHAN  (1982)  and  MUTH,  WOHLGENANT 
(1999) to test for oligopsony market power of the milk processing industry. The profit of a 
representative processor is given by: 
(2)  i i X i i i x w x R z w z p Z'     ) , , ( - × - × = p  
where  p  is  a  vector  of  dairy  product  prices,  R(p,  xi,  zi)  represents  the  revenue  function 
depending in addition on raw milk demand (xi) and other inputs (zi). The symbol w is used for 
the corresponding factor prices. The raw milk supply function is:  
(3)  ) , ( s x w g x =  
Here, s is a vector of supply shifters and x is the total supply of raw milk. However, for 
analysing optimal demand of the processor it is more convenient to use the inverse supply 
function: 
(3')  ) , (
1 s x g wx
- =  
Given (2) and (3) the first order condition for profit maximisation is: 
(3)  0
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 is the average input conjectural elasticity and captures the degree of market 
power (BRESNAHAN 1989). The parameter range is 0 <Q  <1.  0 = Q  corresponds to perfect 
competition, while  1 = Q  characterizes a monopsonistic market. 
5  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1  Empirical implementation 
Raw milk supply was approximated by a translog functional specification in order to be able 
to  identify  relationships  among  the  variables  without  imposing  ex  ante  restrictions  on 
economic relevant parameter (CHAMBERS 1988):  
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where a and A are parameters to be estimated. The elasticity of raw milk supply is: 











= a a e . 
The marginal product  x x R ¶ ¶ ) , , ( z p  in (5) was derived from a translog approximation of the 
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The parameters to be estimated are ß and B. It follows: 
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Substituting (7) and (8) in (5) provides: (10) 
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Equations (6), (8) and (10) constitute a simultaneous nonlinear equation model. In order to 
allow for cross equation co-variation of the error terms a nonlinear three stage estimation 
procedure (NL3SLS) would be appropriate (GREENE 2003). Estimating a NL3SLS requires a 
set of instrumental variables. We used the full set of variables as instruments. Unfortunately, 
we were not able to derive consistent estimate of the system that possess desirables statistical 
properties (Table 2). The Durbin Watson statistics suggested the existence of autocorrelation, 
however, because of convergence problems, we were not able to account for this problem. 
Alternatively,  we  estimated  a  reduced  system  composed  of  the  supply  function  (6)  and 
derived demand (10) (Table 3). In order to save on the number of parameters we imposed 
theoretically  consistent  homogeneity  restrictions  on  the  revenue  function  and  the  supply 
function
3. The individual restrictions are not presented here but are given in the annotations of 
corresponding tables.  
5.2  Estimation results 
The data set consists of 106 observations (from January 1998 to October 2006). Table 1 
provides information about the variables used in the estimation. The endogenous variables 
(market results) are the price of raw milk and the amount of raw milk processing. Since both 
variables show significant seasonal patterns, the original data were adjusted using the x11 
procedure (ESTIMA 2004).  
The supply shifters (s) consist of the prices for feeding stuff, and labour input and the number 
of cows. The two latter variables were subject to several kinds of adjustments. Labour input in 
milk  production  was  calculated  in  three  steps.  First,  total  agricultural  labour  input  was 
weighted by the share of milk in total agricultural output. Second, since only about 80% of the 
Hungarian raw milk production is processed by the dairy companies, the adjusted labour input 
was weighted a second time. In the third step the annual data were transformed into monthly 
time series. The number of cows was adjusted using the second and third step. In addition, a 
time trend was included to account for the impact of technological change on milk supply. 
Land was not considered in the analysis. Data on grassland were available, however since a 
large part of it is fallow and we have no detailed information on this, land would not be a 
scarce factor and thus, would not affect raw milk supply. 
                                                 
3   The revenue function is supposed to be linear homogenous of degree 1 in prices, the degree 
of homogeneity in prices of the supply function (CHAMBERS 1988). Table 1  Variable description 
  Variabl
e  Description  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
price  Price  of  raw  milk,  Ft/kg,  deflated  by  CPI, 
















milk  Amount  of  processed  raw  milk,  in  1000  t, 
seasonally adjusted  133.66  21.81 
feed  Price of animal feed, Ft/kg, deflated by CPI  31.96  2.05 
labour 
Labour  input  in  milk  production,  1000  persons, 
adjusted by the ratio of processed and produced 
milk and the share of milk on total production 





















cows  Number of  cows, in 1000 head,  adjusted by the 
ratio of processed and produced milk  308.23  43.60 
  time  Trend variable  53.50  30.60 
butter  Price of butter, 1000 Ft/kg, deflated by CPI  0.59  0.04 
cheese  Price of cheese, 1000 Ft/kg, deflated by CPI  0.61  0.08 

























break  Dummy variable to account for the abolishment of export subsidies in 
2004 
Revenue  Revenue of the dairy industry, billion Ft, deflated 
by CPI  11.78  1.74 
Source: own estimation 
The shifters of the derived demand function (z) include a trend variable, the prices of butter 
and cheese, labour input in processing. Labour input has to be transformed into a monthly 
series,  the  same  hold  for  the  industry's  revenue.  A  dummy  variable  was  included  in  the 
revenue function to account for the changes in milk policy in 2004. In addition, prices and 
values were deflated by the Consumer Price Index. 
In order to ease the interpretation of the estimation results, all variables were weighted by 
their  geometric  mean.  Because  of  this  transformation,  the  estimates  of  ax,  a a a as,  ßx  and  ßz 
represent elasticities and value shares. The following paragraphs discuss the results. Instead of 
an in-depth discussion of the parameter estimates we will highlight some important aspects. 
Table 2 provides the estimation results of the full system (6), (8) and (10). Since all parameter 
in  (10)  are  already  in  (6)  and  (8),  these  are  presented.  The  DW-statistics  suggests  the 
existence  of  autocorrelation  among  the  residuals.  As  a  consequence,  the  estimates  cannot 
considered to be efficient, thus, the significance of the t-values have to be interpreted with 
care. Acceptable values for the R
2 were obtained for the revenue function only. Moreover, 
only some of the parameter have the expected sign. The value share of butter is positive 
(ßbutter > 0),  however,  its  supply  elasticity  is  positive  (ßbutter*butter+  ßbutter  –  (ßbutter)
2 < 0). 
Beyond, the high value share of butter suggests that the value share for cheese is negative. An 
increase of milk processing affects revenues positively, and, as expected, at a decreasing rate 
(ßmilk*milk  +  ßmilk  –  (ßmilk)
2  <  0).  The  supply  of  raw  milk  increased  with  higher  prices 
(amilk > 0). Moreover, milk supply is relatively inelastic. This is consistent with the implicit 
assumption  that  only  short  run  supply  reactions  are  captured.  This  results  from  using 
quantities of cows and labour instead of their prices as arguments in the supply function. 
Counterintuitive to production economic milk supply decreased  with the number of cows 
(acows < 0).  Table 2  Estimation results of the full system  
Revenue function
1)  Supply function
2) 
Coefficient  Estimate  Coefficient  Estimate 
ßbreak  0.08707*   
ßtime  0.00877***  atime  -0.00336*** 
ßtime*time  0.54602  atime*time  0.00001** 
ßbutter  1.1853***  amilk  0.23002* 
ßlabour  2.0676**  alabour  0.02946 
ßmilk  0.99190***  acows  -0.51675** 
ßbutter*time  0.02128  amilk*time  0.03444*** 
ßlabour*time  0.13027  alabour*time  -0.00833** 
ßmilk*time  -0.00325  acows*time  0.07735** 
ßbutter*butter  -0.73769  amilk*milk  -0.66982 
ßlabour*labour  12.865  alabour*labour  0.04079* 
ßmilk*milk  -0.39939***  acows*cows  6.8910** 
ßbutter*labour  3.6630  amilk*labour  -0.70730** 
ßbutter*milk  0.34076  amilk*cows  6.4706** 
ßlabour*milk  -0.16349  alabour*cows  -0.85544 
Market Power    0.003180 
Durbin Watson  0.9358    1.1723 
R
2  0.9028    0.4271 
1)  The  homogeneity  restrictions  of  the  revenue  function  are  ßbutter  +  ßcheese  =  1, 
ßbutter*time - ßcheese*time =0, ßbutter*butter - ßcheese*cheese = 0, ßbutter*butter – ßbutter*cheese= 0, 
ßbutter*labour – ßcheese*labour = 0, and ßbutter*milk – ßcheese*milk = 0 
2)  The  homogeneity  restrictions  of  the  supply  function  are  amilk  +  afeed  =  0,  
amilk*time  +  afeed*time  =  0,  amilk*milk  =  afeed*feed,  amilk*milk  -  amilk*deed  =  0,  
amilk*labour + afeed*labour = 0, and amilk*cows = afeed*cows. 
*, **, *** denote significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively 
Note:  The R
2 and the DW estimated for the derived demand equation were 0.3608 
and 1.1225 respectively 
Source: own estimation 
The estimated parameter of market power is rather small and not significant. However, given 
the  estimation  problems  of  the  parameters  of  the  supply  and  the  revenue  function  the 
conclusions that market friction which lead to a shift of agricultural rents to processors lacks 
power. In sum, this short discussion of the results provides that the estimation of the full 
system  does  not  only  provide  inefficient  but  also  biased  results  regarding  the  production 
technologies in agriculture and in processing. 
The  results  derived  for  the  reduced  system  are  provided  in  Table  3.  Although  still  not 
satisfactory, the R
2 are higher than in Table 2. Moreover, The DW coefficients take values for 
which it is impossible to decide whether autocorrelation is present or not. This suggests that 
the  results  of  the  reduced  system  are  more  reliable  that  those  of  the  full  system.  This 
impression is confirmed by the significance of the individual parameter estimates. In addition, 
the economic relevant parameters, values share and elasticities, have the correct signs. The parameter value of market power is larger than in the full system, and beyond, significant at 
the 5% level. However, the value is still small, suggesting that market power is not a severe 
problem on the Hungarian milk market. 
Table 3  Estimation results of the reduced system 
Derived demand function
1)  Supply function
1) 
Coefficient  Estimate  Coefficient  Estimate 
ßmilk  1.0043***  atime  0.001056* 
ßmilk*time  0.00099  atime*time  0.00022** 
ßbutter*milk  0.36275**  amilk  0.03665* 
ßlabour*milk  0.56791*  alabour  0.14960* 
ßmilk*milk  -0.35130***  acows  0.10675 
    amilk*time  -0.00514*** 
    alabour*time  -0.00395 
    acows*time  0.01218*** 
    amilk*milk  0.49869*** 
    alabour*labour  0.04645** 
    acows*cows  13.66400*** 
    amilk*labour  -0.69928*** 
    amilk*cows  -5.39250*** 
    alabour*cows  0.73207 
Market Power  0.00154** 
Durbin Watson  2.1063    1.3668 
R
2  0.5562    0.4862 
1) For the homogeneity restriction see the annotations to Table 2. 
*, **, *** denote significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively 
Source: own estimation 
When there is no indication of market power, the questions remains how the decrease of raw 
milk prices in Hungary could be explained after the abolishment of the price support system 
in 2004. The observed reaction can only be explained with a specific structure of the supply 
and demand elasticities on the raw milk market. Generally, the market side that reacts more 
inelastic is able to appropriate the larger part of subsidies (WÖHLKEN 1984). Correspondingly, 
the reduction of the subsidies hits the inelastic partner on the market. Thus, the strong price 
decrease in 2004 has a consistent interpretation as market reaction in the case when raw milk 
supply is inelastic and demand reacts elastically. However, this is exactly revealed by the 
estimates of the reduced system. Raw milk supply elasticity is about 0.036. On the other hand, 
demand reacts relatively elastic. Since all variables were adjusted by their geometric mean the 
demand elasticity is given by the inverse of ßmilk*milk + ßmilk – (ßmilk)
2. Since ßmilk is about one, 
the price elasticity of raw milk demand is around – 3. 
5.3  Market power and the interpretation of Q Q Q Q 
The estimates suggest that market power is not a severe problem in the Hungarian dairy 
market. This results is surprising given the high concentration of dairy processing and the relatively low milk prices in Hungary. However, even farmers are confronted by a relatively 
small number of processors the latter appears not to be able to benefits from their favourable 
industry structure. One reason is the overcapacities in the dairy industry which led to intense 
competition  among  processors  on  the  raw  milk  market.  The  problem  of  overcapacities  is 
aggravated by the fact that farmers posses different opportunities to market their produce. 
They can sell to Hungarian processors, export raw milk, or market their produce directly to 
consumers.  These  choices  might  put,  on  the  average,  Hungarian  milk  producers,  in  a 
relatively favourable market position which hamper the exploitation of market power by the 
dairy industry. In addition, the low prices for raw milk cannot be regarded as a consequence 
of market power but instead of the failure of the processing industry to engage in product 
differentiation and to position itself successively on the market for premium goods which 
allow higher value added and, in turn, would increase the process for the raw materials. Given 
this interpretation, the fact that the evidence for market power is relatively poor is a coherent 
estimation result.  
We derived market power is derived in a conjectural variation approach. Correspondingly, the 
parameter can only be interpreted consistently within this framework. Alternatively to the 
conduct performance approach used in this paper, the existence of market power may be 
analysed in a collusion framework. Using a dynamic oligopoly model with collusion CORTS 
(1999)  shows  that  within  such  a  setting  the  conjectural  variation  approach  systematically 
underestimates the impact of market power on market allocation when supply shocks are not 
permanent.  
With regard to milk production this may be a relevant problem since raw milk supply shows a 
seasonal pattern opposite cyclical changes of raw milk price. Thus, because supply changes 
are temporary underestimation may be a severe problem. However, a definite answer could 
only  be  given  when  the  likelihood  and  possibilities  for  collusive  behaviour  in  the  dairy 
industry would be analysed in more detail. An alternative approach would be to examine the 
price – cost margins in the dairy industry directly. However, because of the lack of data, these 
approaches could not be pursued in this paper. 
6  DISCUSSION 
We motivated our analysis by the questions whether the economic and institutional reforms in 
Hungary  provided  an  environment  in  the  agri-food  chain  in  which  market  allocation  can 
develop its full benefits. In order to be able to do a detailed analysis, we restricted our analysis 
to the milk production and processing, one of the pivotal sectors in Hungarian agriculture. We 
answered the question by developing a formal model that allows conclusion regarding the 
functioning  of  market  by  the  investigation  of  market  results,  i.  e.  prices  and  quantities 
exchanged. 
In a first step we analysed the existence of a domestic market for raw milk by cointegration 
analyses. The results provide that a joint Hungarian market exists. However, the patterns of 
price leadership changed with the abolishment of the price support system in 2004. Given an 
integrated market we moved further and developed in a conjectural variation framework a 
structural market model allowing the identification of the significance of market power. Due 
to estimation problems we were not able to consider the full system, but have to rely our 
interpretation of a reduced system which included market demand and supply only, but not 
the  revenue  function  of  the  processing  industry.  The  estimation  results  provide  that 
oligopsony power is significant but at a very low level. This led us conclude, that factor 
allocation and income distribution on the milk market might not be biased by market power. 
In  addition,  we  were  able  to  explain  the  large  reduction  of  raw  milk  prices  after  the abolishment of the price support system by the structure of demand and supply elasticities. 
The absence of market power on the milk market is also confirmed by the fact that farmers 
posses  alternative  choices  to  market  their  produce  as  there  are  purchases  to  domestic 
producers,  export  of  raw  milk,  and  direct  sales  of  the  produce.  In  addition,  our  results 
demonstrates that the simple look at indicators of market structure like concentration ratios 
may lead to misleading results because of the lacking one-to-one relationship between these 
indicators and the behaviour of firms on the market. 
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